Monday, June 30, 2008

NYT - Always one step behind and one idea away from having an idea




INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE



Amid policy disputes, Qaeda grows in Pakistan

By Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde
Published: June 30, 2008

WASHINGTON: Late last year, top Bush administration officials decided to take a step they had long resisted. They drafted a secret plan to authorize the Pentagon's Special Operations forces to launch missions into the snow-capped mountains of Pakistan to capture or kill top leaders of Al Qaeda.

Intelligence reports for more than a year had been streaming in about Osama bin Laden's terror network rebuilding in the Pakistani tribal areas, a problem that had been exacerbated by years of missteps in Washington and the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, sharp policy disagreements, and turf battles between American counterterrorism agencies.

The new plan, outlined in a highly classified Pentagon order, was designed to eliminate some of those battles. And it was meant to pave an easier path into the tribal areas for American commandos, who for years have bristled at what they see as Washington's risk-averse attitude toward Special Operations missions inside Pakistan. They also argue that catching Bin Laden will come only by capturing some of his senior lieutenants alive.

But more than six months later, the Special Operations forces are still waiting for the green light. The plan has been held up in Washington by the very disagreements it was meant to eliminate. A senior Defense Department official said there was "mounting frustration" in the Pentagon at the ontinued delay.

(for the rest of the article, click on the title above)

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What the more than six pages boils down to is:

- bin Laden's terror network rebuilding in the Pakistani tribal areas

- the rebuilding has been in part due to missteps in Washington and in Islamabad.

- there have been sharp policy disagreements.

- turf battles between American counterterrorism agencies.

Eliminate the first point as that is a consequence of the others.

Pakistan is a very complicated issue. Obama has said he would send troops into Pakistan to hunt down Osama, and those dangerous and irresponsible comments aside, unless one takes time to understand Pakistan's present and past, we will continue to get ignorant statements from ill-informed candidates.

Pakistan's ISI is the real power in Pakistan and has been for several decades. In 1982, US policy changed - from Carter's confused policy regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and installation of Babrak Kamal as Afghan leader, to Reagan pushing for assistance to the opposition within Afghanistan against the Soviets. One small problem. CIA didn't have anyone knowledgeable and skilled in those areas - Urdu or Pashtun or even a superficial understanding of the culture - so instead the US opted to reply upon, after consulting with Pakistan, the native opposition groups - among these - Ahmad Massoud.

Who we support did not solve how we would go about supporting them given the cultural and linguistic issues. This is where ISI stepped in. The Arab jihadists flocking to Afghanistan reached Afghanistan through Iran and through Pakistan. Khomeni was on his jihadi rant - urging all faithful Muslims to attack the Great Satan and the Red Satan. Yet many Arabs chose Pakistan as their entry point due to the cultural / traditional support within an Arab state versus a Persian people less trusting and supporting of Arabs.

Most of the Arab jihadists flocked through Pakistan, where they would find places to live - often five or six males to a home, if the person was wealthier, they might buy a small home / compound and permit fellow jihadists to share the home. During winter months the jihadists would return to Peshwar and other small villages in the frontier region and wait out the spring, when they would return to the battlefields.

The Reagan administration knew who we would help and now we had a where - Pakistan would be the conduit. The question of how - language and cultural issues were tall barriers to overcome. This is where the Pakistani intelligence service jumped in to the mix - they would be the conduit.

ISI would be the middleman between CIA and individuals like Massoud. CIA would bring 100 crates of RPGs and the ISI would lead the CIA (in some cases) through the mountainous areas and into Afghanistan, play the role of middleman and translator, turn over the weapons, and take CIA personnel back. ISI would also play the middleman for funds to aid the jihadists - the US would give millions and the ISI would play the middleman and keep a percent.

In doing so, ISI became powerful - it had wealth and weapons and was necessary to the US plan to undermine the Soviets in Afghanistan. We had to do business with them.

Today, the ISI is broken into leadership and field personnel. Top and bottom. Officers and others. Whatever structure you wish to regard it as - two levels. The TOP level, officers, are Western trained and sympathetic to the Western ideas and views.

The bottom or field personnel - are all supportive of the goals and aims of extremists like Taliban. When the Taliban moved into Afghanistan, it was with the support and aid of the ISI.

Pakistan's president Musharraf, was head of ISI. He understands the threat and the fine line he must walk. Too cozy with the West and that base within ISI switches allegiances and the government will fall and Pakistan will turn into an anti-US/West state. It is not a matter of weeding out the bad eggs or ignoring opposition - these sorts you cannot ignore.

There are those within the US administration who wish to go into Pakistan regardless of whether it bothers Musharraf or not. They fail to understand that while it may work initially, it could topple the government and leave jihdists in charge of the nuclear stockpile.

This issue more than any other in the article, is why the US has not pushed harder. Allow the US to 'invade' Pakistan and everything Bin Laden has said about Musharraf and the US would be proven true. Musharraf would lose the military and ISI and within hours, the Taliban would be the new government in Pakistan.

Everything else in the Herald article / NY Times is obfuscation of these facts.

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Make Mine Freedom - 1948


American Form of Government

Who's on First? Certainly isn't the Euro.